Sound Computational Interpretation of Formal Encryption with Composed Keys by Laud, P. & Corin, R.J.
Sound Computational Interpretation
of Formal Encryption with Composed Keys
Peeter Laud1 and Ricardo Corin2
1 Tartu University, Liivi 2, Tartu, Estonia
peeter l@math.ut.ee
2 University of Twente, P.O.Box 217, 7500AE The Netherlands
corin@cs.utwente.nl
Abstract. The formal and computational views of cryptography have
been related by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway. In their work,
a formal treatment of encryption that uses atomic keys is justified in the
computational world. However, many proposed formal approaches allow
the use of composed keys, where any arbitrary expression can be used
as encryption key. In this paper we consider an extension of the formal
model presented by Abadi and Rogaway, in which it is allowed to use
composed keys in formal encryption. We then provide a computational
interpretation for expressions that allow us to establish the computa-
tional soundness of formal encryption with composed keys.
1 Introduction
Usually, it is necessary to adopt an abstract view of cryptographic operations
(such as message encryption) to make the design and analysis of cryptographic
protocols more manageable.
Two different, but still related abstract views of cryptographic operations
–the formal and the computational– have developed separately in the last years.
In the former, the exchanged messages of the protocol are modelled as formal
expressions of a term algebra. The (cryptographic) operations, such as mes-
sage pairing and encryption, are modelled as term constructors. In this setting,
an adversary and its abilities can be modelled in terms of the messages the
adversary knows; see for e.g. [11]. Furthermore, the security properties a pro-
tocol is supposed to achieve are also modelled formally [9, 19]. On the other
hand, in the computational model, messages are considered to be (more real-
istically) bit-strings, while cryptographic operations are seen as functions over
these bit-strings. Here, an adversary is modelled as any efficient algorithm, while
the security properties of a cryptographic protocol are defined on terms of the
probability of the adversary to perform a succesful attack [13, 5].
Both of the two above models have advantages and disadvantages. On the
one hand, the formal model allows to reason about cryptographic protocols more
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easily and generally. However, such benefits arise from the adoption of fairly
strong assumptions (such as freeness of the term algebra, and fixing the ad-
versary model). On the other hand, the computational model, by considering
messages as bit-strings and modelling the adversary as any efficient algorithm,
provides a more realistic model and thus offers more convincing security guar-
antees. However, proving protocols correct in the computational model is more
difficult and less general than in the formal model.
In the work of Abadi and Rogaway [3], it is shown that if two formal expres-
sions are similar to a formal adversary, then their corresponding computational
interpretations, represented as bit-strings in the computational model, are also
indistinguishable to any computational adversary. This result comprises a very
important step into relating the formal and computational model.
Composed Keys. In [3], formal encryption is modelled by using atomic keys:
that is, a formal expression {M}K represents encryption of message M with
key K, where M is again a formal expression and K is an atomic symbol rep-
resenting the cryptographic key. However, considering only atomic keys in en-
cryption is not sufficient, and sometimes we need to be able to allow encryption
with composed keys, representing non-atomic, constructed keys. In that setting,
the formal language would need to be able to consider expressions of the form
{M}N , where both M and N are expressions. Considering composed keys as
possible encryption keys is important due to that, in protocol design, it is fairly
common to construct symmetric keys from shared secrets and other exchanged
data as part of the protocol run. Examples of this can be found in the work of
Gong [14], and, more recently, in a proposed protocol for achieving private au-
thentication [1]. Moreover, many “real-world” cryptographic protocols use com-
posed keys —see, for example SSL 3.0 [12]. Furthermore, in the formal model,
some approaches based on constraint solving have been designed with specific
support of composed keys [18] (this work was subsequently improved in [10])
and, more recently [4].
This paper defines a computational interpretation [[·]] for the operation
{M}N . Briefly, the interpretation [[{M}N ]] consists of encrypting [[M ]] — the
interpretation of M with a key obtained by applying the random oracle to [[N ]].
So, the interpretation of {M}N is quite intuitive. On the other hand, this forces
us to use the random oracle model as the computational model. Using a ran-
dom oracle seems to be necessary, since otherwise the goodness of keys might be
questioned, as well as the independence of different keys.
We also define a relation ∼= over formal expressions and, as our main contri-
bution, we show that M ∼= N implies the computational indistinguishability of
[[M ]] and [[N ]].
Related Work. The work of Abadi and Rogaway [3] was later extended in
Abadi and Ju¨rjens [2] and Laud [15]. In these works, similar soundness results
were obtained for richer formal languages, where instead of considering values of
formal expressions, it is dealt with outputs of programs. However, differently from
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the formal language presented in this paper, both of these extended languages
still treat the encryption operation as using atomic keys.
Micciancio and Warinschi [17] considered the converse of the soundness result
(i.e., completeness of the formal language of [3]). In their work, it is shown
that a completeness result can be obtained by considering a stronger encryption
scheme, namely an authenticated encryption scheme.
Further extensions of the seminal work [3] deal with encryption cycles in
expressions. For instance, the expression {K}K contains a trivial cycle: key K is
immediately encrypted with itself. In the computational model, the security of a
traditional encryption scheme can be compromised if an adversary gets hold of
a message containing an encryption cycle. Thus, in the original work of Abadi and
Rogaway, formal expressions were restricted to be cycle free. However, further
work of Black et al. [8] and Laud [16] has shown that, in fact, this discrepancy can
be addressed in two different ways: either by considering a new, stronger security
definition of the encryption scheme [8], or by strengthening the adversary model
of the formal model, such that it can be able to “break” encryption cycles [16].
Recently, Bellare and Kohno [6] have studied the security of cryptosystems
against related-key attacks and also provided a construction of a secure cryp-
tosystem against a certain kind of such attacks. Related keys are different from
composed keys — a related key is something that is constructed from an already
existing good key and some non-key data, whereas a composed key is constructed
from non-key data only.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2 we present the formal language. Then, in
Section 3 we introduce some basic notions of the computational model that
are needed in the sequel, and also present an algorithm for translating formal
expressions into computational [distributions of] bit-strings. In Section 4, we
introduce an equivalence relation ∼= over formal expressions. This equivalence
relation ∼= is elaborated and illustrated with some examples in Section 5. After
that, in Section 6 we present the main contribution, a soundness result that
relates the formal and computational models. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Expressions and Patterns
Let Bool be the set {0, 1} and let Keys be the set of formal keys — this is
a fixed, infinite set of symbols. Intuitively, elements of Keys represent crypto-
graphic keys. Also, let Rnd be the set of formal random numbers — again a
fixed, infinite set of symbols disjoint from Keys. The use of Rnd is needed since
usually some of the constructors of formal expressions (such as encryption) rep-
resent probabilistic operations. This means that if such an operation is executed
twice, even with the same arguments, the results will be different. Thus, the
elements of Rnd are used to keep track which subexpressions of an expression
represent the same invocation of that operation and which subexpressions rep-
resent different invocations. Our set of formal expressions Exp is defined by the
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following grammar:
M,N ::= b (bit)
| K (key)
| (M,N) (pair)
| {M}rN (encryption) .
Here, b ∈ Bool, K ∈ Keys and r ∈ Rnd. Clearly, we can see that composed
keys are allowed in the encryption operation. As the labels r are identifiers of
invocations of the encryption algorithm, we demand that whenever we consider
two expressions {M}rN and {M ′}rN ′ with the same label r, then also M = M ′
and N = N ′.
Even though Abadi and Rogaway [3] did not use formal random numbers,
they assumed that each occurrence of the encryption constructor represents a dif-
ferent invocation of the encryption operation. Furthermore, the later work of
Abadi and Ju¨rjens [2] considered a richer language in which they also needed to
keep track of different invocations. This was done, similarly to the present work,
by using formal random numbers.
Let us define some notation related to the structure of formal expressions.
The subexpression relation  is the smallest reflexive transitive relation over
Exp containing M  (M,N), N  (M,N), M  {M}rN and N  {M}rN for all
M,N ∈ Exp and r ∈ Rnd. For an expression M , we denote:
keys(M) := {K ∈ Keys : K  M}
rns(M) := {r ∈ Rnd : {N ′}rN  M for some N ′, N ∈ Exp}
atoms(M) := keys(M) ∪ rns(M)
We call the elements of atoms(M) the atoms of M .
Intuitively, a formal pattern describes what an adversary is able to see when
looking at an expression. The elements P,Q of the set of formal patterns Pat is
defined by the following grammar:
P,Q ::= b (bit)
| K (key)
| (P,Q) (pair)
| {P}rQ (encryption)
| r (undecryptable) .
Here, r denote ciphertexts that are encrypted with a key that the adversary
does not know, and thus can not “see” inside. We use formal random numbers to
differentiate between these ciphertexts, and therefore we require that the formal
random numbers used at encryptions be different from formal random numbers
used at undecryptables. Now, the relation , as well as the functions keys , rns
and atoms are extended to Pat. Finally, note that the sets rns(P ) and atoms(P )
also contain formal random numbers at the undecryptables.
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3 Computational Interpretation
In the computational model, an encryption system is a triple of polynomial-time
algorithms (G, E ,D) working with bit-strings. Here, G and E are probabilistic
algorithms while D is deterministic. The key generation algorithm G takes as
input the security parameter n, represented in unary, and returns a new key.
The encryption algorithm E takes as input the security parameter, a key and
a plaintext and produces a corresponding ciphertext. Since E is probabilistic,
different invocations of E may return different ciphertexts. Lastly, the decryption
algorithm D takes as input the security parameter, a key and a ciphertext and
returns the corresponding plaintext.
Let 0 be a fixed bit-string. We say that the encryption system (G, E ,D) is
type-0 secure [3] if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithmsA(·),(·)
(with interfaces to two oracles), the difference of probabilities
Pr[AE(1n,k,·),E(1n,k′,·)(1n) = 1 : k, k′ ← G(1n)]−
Pr[AE(1n,k,0),E(1n,k,0)(1n) = 1 : k ← G(1n)]
is negligible in n. A function is negligible if its reciprocal grows faster than any
polynomial. In [3], Abadi and Rogaway showed that type-0 security is achievable
under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Let (G, E ,D) be a type-0 secure encryption system, such that the distri-
bution G(1n) is the uniform probability distribution over {0, 1}(n), where  is
a fixed polynomial. Now, being type-0 secure guarantees that the algorithm E is
probabilistic, and thus we denote by Er the invocation of E with random coin-
flips r ∈ {0, 1}∗. Thus, if we fix r, the algorithm Er is now deterministic. In the
security definition, we assume the uniform distribution of r.
Now, let x be a bit-string. A random oracle R is a machine that, on query
(1m, x), first checks whether it has been queried with the same values before.
If this is the case, then it returns the same answer as before. Otherwise, it
proceeds as follows. First, the random oracle creates, uniformly and randomly,
a bit-string y of length m. Then, the random oracle records the query (1m, x)
together with y, and then finally y is returned. In the random oracle model [7],
there is a single random oracle in the world, while all other algorithms and
machines are allowed to query this oracle. To be able to translate a model in the
random oracle world into a real system, the random oracle needs to be replaced
with some “random-looking” function h. Thus, there is a leap of faith involved
in applying the results proved in the random oracle model to a real system.
Nevertheless, we can still be sure that if the real system is insecure, then this
must be caused by h not being a good approximation of R.
Now we are ready to give a computational interpretation to expressions and
patterns. With each P ∈ Pat we associate a family (indexed by the security
parameter) of probability distributions over bit-strings. We denote that family
by [[P ]]. Fig. 1 depicts the algorithm sampling the n-th distribution in that family.
First, Initialize(1n, P ) is run and then Convert(1n, P ) is invoked.
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algorithm Initialize(1n, P )
for all K ∈ keys(P ) do τ (K) ← G(1n)
τbb ← G(1n)
for all r ∈ rns(P ) do τ (r) R∈ {0, 1}∗
algorithm Convert(1n, P )
if P is K ∈ Keys
return 〈τ (K), “key”〉
else if P is b ∈ Bool
return 〈b, “bit”〉
else if P is (P1, P2)
let x = Convert(1n, P1)
let y = Convert(1n, P2)
return 〈x, y, “pair”〉
else if P is {P2}rP1
let x = Convert(1n, P1)
let y = Convert(1n, P2)
let z = Eτ(r)(1n, R(1(n), x), y)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
else: P is r
let z = Eτ(r)(1n, R(1(n), τbb),0)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
Fig. 1. Algorithm sampling [[P ]]
Note that if P1 = P2 then if we sample 〈x, y, “pair”〉 ← [[(P1, P2)]]n, then the
probability for x = y is negligible.
In fact, the existence of the random oracle is itself sufficient for the existence
of type-0 encryption systems. In particular, we could have fixed the encryption
system, for example, to the one given in [8]. However, we would like to use the
random oracle as little as possible and thus we have not fixed it.
Two families of probability distributions over bit-strings D and D′ are in-
distinguishable (denoted D ≈ D′) if for all PPT algorithms A, the difference of
probabilities
Pr[A(1n, x) : x ← Dn]− Pr[A(1n, x) : x ← D′n]
is negligible in n. In fact, indistinguishability is the computational equivalent of
sameness.
4 Equivalence Relation on Pat
We would like to define an equivalence relation ∼= over formal expressions (and
more generally, over patterns), such that M ∼= N implies [[M ]] ≈ [[N ]]. Similarly
to Abadi and Rogaway, we define a function pattern : Exp −→ Pat and state
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M ∼= N iff pattern(M) and pattern(N) can be obtained from each other by an
α-conversion over keys and formal random numbers. Even though we could also
define the function pattern similarly to [3], that is by giving the entailment rela-
tion  (this relation describes which formal expressions the Dolev-Yao attacker
may obtain from a given expression) and replacing the undecryptable encryp-
tions in the expressions by the corresponding “blobs” , we chose to give a
different equivalence definition. The reason for this is that, if we followed Abadi
and Rogaway, then we would have to assume that the expressions M and N
do not contain encryption cycles. With atomic keys only, an encryption cycle
in an expression M is a sequence of keys K1, . . . ,Km, where Ki is encrypted
under Ki+1 (possibly indirectly) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and Km is encrypted
under K1, all in the expression M . Even though the definition of type-0 security
does not say anything about the security of encryption cycles; in systems where
the Abadi and Rogaway results can be applied, encryption cycles cannot occur.
However, when considering composed keys, the definition of encryption cycles is
likely much more contrieved, because the different parts of the same key have to
be kept track of. Therefore, we avoid defining the encryption cycles at all, and
thus our definition of ∼= applies to all expressions.
Let P,Q ∈ Pat. The operation boxQ(P ) replaces all encryptions of the form
{·}rQ occurring in P with undecryptables. Formally, the operation boxQ(P ) is
defined by
boxQ(b) = b
boxQ(K) = K
boxQ((P1, P2)) = (boxQ(P1), boxQ(P2))
boxQ({P2}rP1) =
{
r, if P1 = Q
{boxQ(P2)}rboxQ(P1), if P1 = Q
boxQ(r) = r .
We are looking for sufficient conditions for [[P ]] ≈ [[boxQ(P )]]. In particular, we
are going to prove that the following is a sufficient condition. Let TP be the set
of all atoms occurring in P , except that if P has subexpressions of the form {·}rQ,
then the keys and random numbers inside that Q do not count. The sufficient
condition that we are looking for is atoms(Q) ⊆ TP . To state this formally, we
define the sets BQ(P ) for all P ∈ Pat in the following way:
BQ(b) = ∅
BQ(K) = {K}
BQ((P1, P2)) = BQ(P1) ∪ BQ(P2)
BQ({P2}rP1) =
{
{r} ∪ BQ(P2), if P1 = Q
{r} ∪ BQ(P1) ∪ BQ(P2), if P1 = Q
BQ(r) = {r}
and set TP := BQ(P ).
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If the above condition is fulfilled we say that P ∼= boxQ(P ). We also say
P ∼= Q whenever Q can be obtained from P through some α-conversion applied
to its formal keys and random numbers. Finally, we extend ∼= to an equivalence
relation.
Now we are ready to define the function pattern. Let P ∈ Pat. If there exists
some Q ∈ Pat, such that P = boxQ(P ) (i.e. Q occurs as an encryption key some-
where in P ) and P ∼= boxQ(P ) then we put pattern(P ) := pattern(boxQ(P )).
Otherwise we put pattern(P ) := P . It is easy to check that pattern is well-
defined. Furthermore, the function pattern is efficiently computable.
5 Examples
Before going to the proof that equivalence implies indistinguishability of inter-
pretations, let us see some examples. We are not going to repeat the examples
given by Abadi and Rogaway [3]1. In our examples we intend to illustrate and
clarify what constitutes an “encryption cycle” in an expression and what does
not.
– {K1}r(K1,K2) ∼= r. This is so since the atom K2 of the encryption key
(K1,K2) does not occur anywhere else.
– {(K1,K2)}r(K1,K2) ∼= r. This expression is a clear-cut encryption cycle.
However, encryption cycles can be more subtle, as the next two examples
show.
– {(K2,K1)}r(K1,K2) ∼= r.
– ({K1}r1(K1,K2), {K2}
r2
(K1,K2)
) ∼= (r1 ,r2).
– {{K2}r1K1}r{K2}r1K1 
∼= r, but {{K2}r2K1}r{K2}r1K1
∼= r. The first example con-
tains an encryption cycle. The second example, however, does not, because
the atom r1 of the key does not occur anywhere else. These two examples
show the importance of formal random numbers.
– ({K1}r(K1,K2),K2) ∼= (r,K2). Compared to the first example, the addition
of K2 means that now all atoms of the encryption key occur somewhere else.
6 Correctness Proof
Theorem. Let P,Q ∈ Pat, such that atoms(Q) ⊆ BQ(P ). Then [[P ]] ≈
[[boxQ(P )]].
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. there is an algorithm A that can distin-
guish the families of probability distributions [[P ]] and [[boxQ(P )]]. Fig. 2 shows
an algorithm (first call Initialize and then Convert) sampling either [[P ]]
1 The reader checking out these examples should keep in mind that:
– [3] uses no formal random numbers; each occurrence of the encryption constructor
is assumed to have a different formal random number attached to it;
– in [3], M ∼= N does not imply [[M ]] ≈ [[N ]], if M or N contains encryption cycles.
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algorithm Initialize(1n, P,Q)
for all K ∈ BQ(P ) do τ (K) ← G(1n)
for all r in the set
BQ(P )\
({r′ ∈ Rnd |r′ occurs in P} ∪ {r′ ∈ Rnd | {·}r′Q occurs in P})
do τ (r)
R∈ {0, 1}∗
algorithm Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q)
if Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q) has been invoked before
return the value returned previously
if P is K ∈ Keys
return 〈τ (K), “key”〉
else if P is b ∈ Bool
return 〈b, “bit”〉
else if P is (P1, P2)
let x = Convertf,g(1n, P1, Q)
let y = Convertf,g(1n, P2, Q)
return 〈x, y, “pair”〉
else if P is {P2}rP1
if P1 = Q
let y = Convertf,g(1n, P2, Q)
let z ← f(y)
else
let x = Convertf,g(1n, P1, Q)
let y = Convertf,g(1n, P2, Q)
let z = Eτ(r)(1n, R(1(n), x), y)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
else: P is r
let z ← g(0)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
Fig. 2. Algorithm sampling either [[P ]] or [[boxQ(P )]]
or [[boxQ(P )]], depending on the values of the oracles f and g. If f and g are
E(1n, k, ·) and E(1n, k′, ·), then the algorithm in Fig. 2 samples [[P ]]. If f and g are
both E(1n, k,0) then this algorithm samples [[boxQ(P )]]. Composing this algo-
rithm with algorithm A allows us to break the type-0 security of the encryption
system.
We have to show that the algorithm Convertf(·),g(·) can complete its job,
i.e. it does not have to access τ at a point where it is undefined. If a key K occurs
in P but does not belong to BQ(P ) then this key only occurs as a subexpression
of Q, where Q is used as an encryption key in P . But Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, Q,Q)
is never needed in this context, the oracle f is used instead of encrypting with it.
Therefore we do not need the value of K there. Similarly, if r ∈ Rnd occurs in P
but not in BQ(P ) then we would need it only for computing the interpretation
of the encryption key Q, which is not necessary to compute at all. If r belongs
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to the set subtracted from BQ(P ) in the algorithm Initialize, then τ(r) is not
used, but the oracles f or g generate some random numbers of their own.
We have to argue that the algorithm in Fig. 2 indeed samples the claimed
families of distributions. Clearly, if f and g are both E(1n, k,0), then Con-
vertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q) samples [[boxQ(P )]]. If f is E(1n, k, ·) and g is E(1n, k′, ·)
then we have to show that the key k used by f is indistinguishable from R(1(n),
Convert(1n, Q,Q)) even when we are given the values of τ on BQ(P ). The
key used by f is independent of all the given values of τ . Also, these values of
τ do not uniquely determine Convertf,g(1n, Q,Q) yet, because atoms(Q) ⊆
BQ(P ). Even more, with given values of τ we can guess the value of Con-
vertf,g(1n, Q,Q) only with negligible success probability. Therefore the appli-
cation of the random oracle to this value gives us a random bit-string that is
independent of the given values of τ . The key used by f and the bit-string
R(1(n),Convert(1n, Q,Q)) are identically distributed, therefore they are in-
distinguishable under given conditions. Hence we conclude that Convertf(·),g(·)
(1n, P,Q) samples [[P ]]. 
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered an extension of the work of Abadi and Rog-
away [3]. This extension is mainly constituted by considering the use of com-
posed, non-atomic keys in the encryption operator of the formal language.
Briefly, we proceeded as follows: First, we related formal expressions in our lan-
guage with an equivalence relation ∼=. By providing an intuitive computational
interpretation, and then showing that each time two formal expressions that are
equivalent according to ∼= are also indistinguishable in the computational world,
we have lifted the work of Abadi and Rogaway [3] to the case of composed keys.
As we already mentioned, support for encryption with composed keys is im-
portant since many cryptographic protocols use them [14, 1, 12]. Thus, having
the soundness result for the case of formal encryption with composed keys pro-
vides further faithfulness in the verification results of formal approaches that
support composed keys (such as [18, 10, 4].)
While giving the computational interpretation, we needed to use the random
oracle. Thus, our approach gives less security guarantees than the original work
of Abadi and Rogaway, based on standard security assumptions. However, we
believe the use of the random oracle is necessary to guarantee the goodness
and independence of the constructed keys. Usage of the random oracle allow
us to model the situation in which a user generates keys in a completely secure
manner, which is in accordance with the existing definitions in the computational
model. However, in some situations (e.g. when considering composed keys), the
key generation process may not be a so private activity. In this new setting, an
adversary might have some knowledge about the randomness used during the key
generation. Furthermore, a stronger and active adversary may even have some
control over the key generation process. We believe it would be interesting to
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study such a new scenario, where new and proper definitions (and constructions)
would be needed.
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